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Coordination & cooperation in financial regulation: Do 
regulators comply with banking culture? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper identifies cultural gaps as a possible stumbling block in the efficient 
exchange of information and the sharing of problems and goals among regulators 
and the industry, with respect to the recent innovations introduced in the financial 
sector, which are orienting the supervisory authorities towards the adoption of 
new interaction models with the supervised financial intermediares.  
 
In greater detail, the paper describes how financial supervisory models have 
evolved towards solutions based on increasing cooperation between the regulators 
and financial intermediaries (§ 1). This has led to the definition of a new role for 
the supervisory authorities, which, in parallel, encourages the innovation of the 
organizational tools employed for communicating and exchanging information 
with the supervised entities (§ 2). These tools are classified and analyzed, with 
respect to their field of application and their connections with the supervised 
fields (§ 3). Consequently, in order to analyze the sharing of knowledge and 
cultural models between the supervisory bodies and the supervised entities, it is 
important  the in-depth assessment of the current extent of the cultural gap. The 
paper then presents a cultural survey, based on the application of a text-analysis 
model to a corpus of reference texts produced by three samples, drawn from 
among the supervisory bodies (Basel Committee and Bank of Italy) and the 
supervised entities (§ 4). The empirical survey results reveal many fields of 
cultural differentiation, alongside several important areas in which the orientations 
of the parties tend to overlap (§ 5). 
 
 
2. Recent trends in supervisory models 
 
The issue of banking regulation is at the centre of an important international 
debate, with respect to its role and the ways in which the supervisory functions are 
exercised. Generally speaking, the supervisory authorities’ actions are based on a 
rather broad and complex system of activities and instruments. The survey by the 
World Bank on the regulation and supervision of banks in 107 countries 
comprises twelve separate parts, covering the following aspects of a country’s 
banking system: domestic and foreign bank entry, government ownership of 
banks, capital adequacy, restrictions on bank activities, supervisory power, 
independence, resources, loan classification stringency, provisioning standards, 
diversification guidelines, deposit insurance system, provisioning and risk 
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management requirements, information disclosure requirements, crisis 
management (Barth, Caprio, Levine, 2001).  
 
In the last few years the regulation of banks and financial intermediaries has 
changed radically, becoming increasingly indirect (from structural regulation to 
prudential and consensual regulation and self-regulation)
 
(Gualandri 2001; 
Carretta, Schwizer, Stefanelli, 2003).  
 
According to the first empirical assessments, the most effective supervisory 
policies in ensuring improved conditions of stability and enhanced performance 
appear to be those aimed at promoting “private” supervision, by means of 
transparent and significant accounting and information disclosure requirements, 
principles of governance and management control, common criteria of sound and 
prudent management (Barth, Caprio, Levine, 1999 and 2001).  
 
In the consensual regulatory approach, which reduces outside intervention in a 
bank’s management, a reduction of the regulatory costs incurred by the 
intermediary can be discerned (Elliehausen, 1998). This occurs if the supervisory 
action is effective in promoting and encouraging the adoption of internal control 
systems. Building a mindful and responsible management, through mechanisms of 
self-analysis and self-control, enhances the possibility of pursuing “economies of 
scale and scope”, in terms of the broadness of the benefits descending from 
regulation, and of the reduction of the time needed to adapt to it. 
 
The efficacy of this arrangement primarily depends on the level of competition in 
the financial market. In high competition, operators become more sensitive to the 
judgement of the market, and are therefore encouraged to adopt a “virtuous” 
management approach, within a self-regulatory framework. Moreover, this 
approach encourages the development of a supervisory culture, which can then 
become a powerful tool for guiding individual actions towards the achievement of 
sound and prudent management. The latter is also determined by the supervisory 
bodies’ actual capacity to get to understand and guide the management behaviour 
of the supervised entities, taking account of the differences existing among them, 
in terms of shareholding structure, size, and business activities (Carretta, 1998). 
This is no easy task, which requires a certain re-orientation of supervisory 
activities towards the production and organizational processes of the supervised 
entities; the use, for this purpose, of all the available information; and the 
development, by the supervisory bodies, of a banking culture (which 
unquestionably differs from the traditional regulatory culture), which can be 
achieved also by means of further efforts in collecting information and broadening 
its knowledge base.  
 
In any case, within a more balanced supervisory framework, it is important to 
achieve improved conditions for a microprudential view, i.e. a focus on the 
behaviour of the individual financial intermediaries, to balance the current trend 
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that focuses on a macroprudential view, which, by itself, might be viewed as too 
abstract and distant from the actual market behaviours (Carretta, 1998).   
 
In fact, in recent years the supervisory authorities have focused increasingly on 
how the financial intermediaries organize the production, administration and 
distribution processes of the respective business areas, and have established 
principles and rules aimed at promoting suitable corporate organizations (Pisanti, 
2002). They interact with the supervised entities, encouraging the improvement of 
the organizational and internal control processes, according to a certificatory, 
rather than strictly regulatory, approach. They have become consultants of the 
financial institutions, thus helping to spread knowledge of the best practises: 
supervision and management support are becoming more and more intertwined, 
with a view to achieving stability and efficiency, by encouraging sound and 
prudent management practises. From this point of view, the search for cultural 
consistency between the supervisory authorities and the financial industry is an 
important objective for improving supervisory activities. 
 
 
3. Moving towards a new role for supervisory authorities  
 
The implementation of new supervisory arrangements, based on self-regulation 
and the coordination of external and internal supervision, determines an evolution 
in the role played by the supervisory authorities, and in the manner in which they 
interact with the governance bodies of the banks, such as the board of directors, 
top management and external and internal auditors.  
 
Delegating supervision by the supervisory authorities to the supervised entities 
entails the capacity, by the former, to define the minimum objective compliance 
requirements for the internal control systems (Bank of Italy, 1998 and 2002), 
while at the same time encouraging organizational and management decision-
making that is compatible with the supervision objectives.  
 
The aim of the regulatory intervention also includes developing the banks’ ability 
to avoid fraudulent behaviour, which is capable of jeopardizing their stability, and 
that of the system as a whole, encouraging the intermediaries’ attitude to 
constantly adapt their production processes to strategic decisions that are 
consistent with market evolution, and fine-tuning the corporate governance 
bodies’ ability to take on the various types of risk related to operating and 
financial innovation.  
 
This new supervisory arrangement requires that compliance with the criterion of 
sound and prudent management - pursued through the functionality and adequacy 
of the internal control systems - must become a rule of conduct for intermediaries, 
that is, an intermediate objective capable of combining the approach of both the 
supervisory bodies and the supervised entities: for the supervisory authority, the 
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first guarantee of a sound and prudent management resides in a business’ capacity 
of prevention and intervention, by means of an appropriate internal control 
system. On the other hand, the management itself must reach more or less the 
same conclusion: greater capacity of governance is required because of the 
increased exposure of banks to new and old risks, in consequence of the 
opportunities granted to each business under the new regulatory framework (De 
Maio, Patalano, 1995). 
 
This overlapping of the objectives of both the supervisors and the supervised, by 
increasing the degree of consistency between the regulatory principles, on the one 
hand, and the intermediaries’ management criteria, on the other hand, will in all 
likelihood lessen the weight of the restrictions and the measures introduced by the 
regulatory authorities (Airoldi, 2002).  
 
Furthermore, the revised Basel Accord on Capital (Basel 2) envisages the 
possibility for banks to adopt internal procedures for assessing asset requirements, 
with respect to credit and operational risks, like in the previous Accord of 1996 on 
market risk. Moreover, the banks opting for an internal approach to credit and 
operational risk management for supervisory purposes must provide evidence, to 
the supervisory authority, that they are capable of meeting a set of minimum 
requirements, on an ongoing basis. These requirements may be identified, inter 
alia, in the management’s attitude to ensure widespread communication of its 
corporate strategy and risk management policies, aimed at the creation of a risk 
culture; in the structured interaction between the management itself and the risk 
control units, with a view to pursuing the implementation of criteria relating to 
control system efficiency, adequacy of resources, and efficacy of corrective 
measures, vis-à-vis any shortcomings identified by the control procedures put into 
place. Therefore, banks are required to systematically map the activities most 
exposed to the risks in question, and to develop suitable procedures aimed at 
consistently assess expected losses over a certain period of time. These must be 
reported in historical data series, subject to appropriate back-testing. Banks are 
also required to adopt their risk measurement methods in decision making and 
day-to-day management activities.  
 
The internal risk management models must be preventively approved by the 
supervisory authorities. The procedure aims at making sure that they take account 
of both corporate needs and the minimum requirements laid down by the 
authority, representing a solution achieved by “mutual consent”, so to speak, 
resulting from a dialogue between the supervisors and the supervised. In this case 
too the standard-making proposals feature a supervisory approach based on a 
bilateral dialogue, grounded on the gradual “delegation” of supervision from the 
supervisory body to the supervised entity, and on the transition from an approach 
based on the “supervision of activities” to one based on the “supervision of 
controls”. In encouraging intermediaries to adopt the advanced approaches, due to 
the possibility of achieving benefits, in terms of the regulatory capital, the 
regulations promote improved responsibility and awareness, with respect to the 
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actual corporate risk levels. Therefore, the Basel Committee highlights that the 
prudential control process acknowledges the bank management’s responsibility in 
developing an internal risk assessment process, and in establishing asset 
objectives commensurate with the bank’s risk profile and control structure. The 
type of control that is gaining ground at supranational level, therefore, fosters 
general self-regulation mechanisms, which does not mean self-determination of 
the rules, but the independent management of the rules established externally and 
inspired by the best practises within the industry.  
 
To approve the internal control procedures proposed by the banks, it is not 
possible to build an automatic process, but it is necessary to put into place a set of 
competencies and benchmarks capable of ascertaining the supervisor’s 
professional skills, independence and objectivity in the assessment of these 
models.  
 
Aware of this need, the Basel 2 Accord (Basel Committee, 2004) has specified in 
a number of occasions that the supervisory authorities must employ the suitable 
resources and competencies suited to, (i) the assessment of the adequacy of the 
internal control systems adopted, and (ii) the approval of the internal methods for 
determining the asset requirements related to credit and operational risks.  
 
This outlines a new role for the supervisory authority, that of “certifying body”, 
with respect to the consistency of the practises and models adopted by the banks, 
on the one hand, and the principle of sound and prudent management and, 
specifically, the independent risk assessment requirements, on the other hand. 
 
The role of certifying body carries with it new operational duties and relationship 
models, between the supervisory authorities and the supervised entities, which 
imply an “active” and “driving” function by the former, in respect of regulatory 
compliance by the latter. This development corresponds to the growing need, by 
banks and financial intermediaries, of assistance in the implementation of the risk 
assessment and risk management processes. 
 
The importance of the supervisory authorities’ advisory role also emerges with 
regard to the control procedures put into place by the banks and, in particular, to 
the complex system of relations between the various internal and external auditing 
bodies. Regarding the operating mechanisms and information instruments on 
which the control functions are based, the Basel Committee assigns a guiding role 
to the supervisory authorities, which are called on to encourage the internal 
auditors - and, indeed, the structure as a whole - to adopt the necessary measures 
to ensure the effectiveness of the internal control system.  
 
The capacity to adequately perform advisory functions entails the existence of: (1) 
consistent objectives by both the supervisory authorities and the supervised 
entities, which is one of the basic principles of the consensual regulatory 
approach, in order to overcome the traditional division between the parties; (2) 
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consistent knowledge, which allows both parties to clearly understand the 
business activities; and (3) consistent cultural models, especially as regards the 
basic values and means of communication. 
 
 
4. The organizational solutions for developing a common knowledge base, 
shared by banks and supervisory authorities 
 
Financial intermediaries and supervisory authorities may develop a common 
knowledge base by implementing coordination procedures, capable of 
encouraging the exchange of information and mutual interaction in problem 
analysis and solving (Mintzberg, 1985).  
These tools, which must be suited to the specific organization of the banks, as 
well as to the specific coordination procedures, fall into 4 categories:  
a) economic incentives; 
b) organizational structures; 
c) integration mechanisms; 
d) information and communication flows. 
 
Similar consideration, taking account of the specificity of the problem and, 
therefore, the nature of the proposed tools, have been formulated with reference to 
the issue of coordination between the supervisory bodies and the banks’ internal 
and external auditors (Schwizer, 2005). 
 
a) Economic mechanisms: incentives for supervisory compliance  
The parallel analysis of the Basel 2 proposals and the domestic regulations on 
internal control systems (Bank of Italy, 1998 and 2002) highlights a significant 
inter-dependence between the two sets of regulations, whereby the latter is the 
necessary and indispensable premise of the former. What emerges, in fact, is a 
potential competitive edge for the banks that adopt a “compliant” control system, 
thus finding that, in this manner, they already possess most of the organizational 
requirements needed for the approval of the internal methods for determining 
capital requirements for credit and operational risks. According to the current 
supervisory arrangements, banks are encouraged to adopt a suitable and functional 
internal control system enabling them both to comply with the regulations set 
forth by the Bank of Italy, and to achieve savings in terms of regulatory capital.  
 
b) The organization of the internal control body: from functions to projects 
The adoption of an internal control system obliges banks to address the need to 
adopt process-based organizational models, integrated with the basic functional or 
divisional structure, in order to identify the various risk-entailing micro-activities 
and the monitoring responsibilities.  
This requires the overhauling of the organizational structures and roles, by means 
of the introduction of communication flows and information collection systems 
across the structure, consistently with the types of risks for each business area. 
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The result is a “quasi matrix” structure, in which the business responsibilities 
(formulating strategies and defining operating plans, and the related decision 
sustainability assessments, with respect to both the risks taken on and the 
available control systems) interact with those managing the various types of risks. 
 
Such an arrangement also affects the procedures for collecting and processing the 
risk-related information, and the consequent production of knowledge by the 
banks and other financial intermediaries. The functional activity-based logic is 
gradually replaced by a process or problem-based approach. 
 
In order to ensure the effective performance of its supervisory activities by the 
supervisory authorities, according to an advisory approach (capable of assuring a 
basic understanding of the problems of the supervised entities), besides a shared 
viewpoint of the problems, it is also expedient to establish a symmetry between 
the abovementioned organizational structures (organizational units and 
responsibilities) and the supervisory structures.  
 
This means, on the one hand, enhancing the uniformity of the problems and risks 
related to the various business areas, rather than the similarity of organizational 
structures; and, on the other hand, scrapping the principal of function or activity-
based supervision and moving towards a problem-based approach, which can be 
implemented by introducing “working by projects”, which can enable the 
supervisory authorities: (i) to extensively monitor each type of risks - across the 
supervised entities’ structures and activities - developing the appropriate 
professional skills with respect to each issue, and (ii) to propose cutting-edge and 
innovatory proposals for solving new problems related to each business. 
 
What ensues is a large-scale requirement of organizational flexibility within the 
supervisory authority, which can be met by introducing appropriate tools, not just 
of a technological nature - which, indeed, are necessary for collecting, transferring 
and processing the information, in support of the decision-making and supervisory 
processes - but also consisting of cross-company coordination bodies (as product, 
process and business area managers), associated with objective-based 
management systems and horizontal communications systems, aimed at 
promoting the sharing of information and goals and determining the accelerated 
creation of specialist skills.  
 
These tools must be strengthened through the dissemination of cultural models 
inspired by the principles of cooperation and teamwork, and enhancing of the 
staff’s entrepreneurial spirit and participation in the development of services 
aimed at achieving maximum professional growth, to underpin both the 
effectiveness of the control activities, but also of the quality of the advisory 
services provided to its counterparts.  
 
As W.J. McDonough, President of the Federal Bank di New York, said some time 
ago, at the presentation of the new organizational structure of his control unit: 
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“we’ve organized ourselves better, in order to share with you (the supervised 
entities) our point of view and our competencies, with respect to the best practices 
used by all financial institutions” (McDonough,  2003). 
 
c) Integration mechanisms: towards more efficient coordination 
In order to enhance mutual adjustment, flexibility and systematicity of relations 
and, therefore, the efficiency of decision-making and problem-solving processes 
inside supervisory system (which comprises the supervisory authorities, the 
supervised entities, the authorities supervising over connected industries, and the 
authorities of other countries), integration mechanisms (Mintzberg, 1985) can be 
put into place. These mechanisms may comprise: committees, task forces, 
integration managers (program or project managers).  
 
The Basel Committee adopts this solution explicitly, within the framework of the 
“Basel 2” (Basel Committee, 2004). With a view to supporting the 
implementation of the Accord, the Committee has set up two integration bodies, 
respectively called the AIG (Accord Implementation Group) and CTF (Capital 
Task Force). The former is a committee composed of the representatives of the 
regulatory bodies of the various Accord-member countries, and is a forum where 
they can exchange information on the practical problems encountered in the 
application of the new arrangement, and on the relevant problem-solving 
strategies. The latter is a working group of the Basel Committee, responsible for 
examining significant amendments to and interpretations of the New Accord. The 
Committee views these two bodies as key long-term tools, especially once the 
banks have started implementing the prescribed provisions. In particular, the CTF 
has the responsibility of analysing new banking products, and the implications 
that the developments in the risk management processes may have on the new 
arrangement, also after its entry into force. 
 
d) Information exchange and communications systems: knowledge management 
and supervision 
The indispensable tool for creating knowledge is the permanent and systematic 
exchange of information, at various levels: 
• between bank management and the banking supervisors;  
• between external auditors and the supervisors; 
• between the supervisors, with respect to different financial sectors, and 
between the authorities of different countries.  
 
With regard to item one, it is necessary to point out that the implementation of the 
internal control systems - in accordance with the requirements laid down in the 
Supervisory Instructions at national level - has encouraged the intense exchange 
of information and documents (organizational regulations, strategic plans, audit 
plans, etc.), between the Bank of Italy and the banks. 
 
The Basel Committee too has underlined, on a number of occasions, that the 
frequent exchange of information between the banks and the supervisors is 
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fundamental for the effective implementation of the “Basel 2” Accord. In this 
sense, Himino (2004) argues that “Basel 2” framework provides a common 
language that improves communication among banks, supervisors and investors. 
 
With regard to item two, the specific provisions by the Basel Committee oblige 
the supervisors to cooperate and exchange information with the external and 
internal auditors, and to advise the banks on how the bodies can cooperate. This 
cooperation is particularly important with a view to ensuring the efficiency and 
functionality of the overall system of internal control.  
 
The Committee points out that there is a complementary interest between the 
supervisors and the external auditors (Basel Committee, 2002), with special 
reference to the internal control system and information disclosure systems, which 
must justify a constant flow of information between the bodies, and cooperation in 
monitoring the risks taken on by the banks.   
 
With regard to item three, the exchange of information between the supervisors of 
different countries primarily concerns the cross-supervision of complex 
international banking groups, but also supervisory activities of different financial 
sectors, for the purpose of monitoring the risks in the banking groups and 
multibusiness financial risks.  
 
The coordination process could also be functional for the improved allocation of 
resources and competencies for supervisory purposes: a more closer collaboration, 
in fact, would make it possible to support the supervisors in countries that lack the 
means to collect the necessary information for the effective implementation of the 
New Accord. With regard to this issue, principles have been developed aimed at 
encouraging closer practical cooperation and the exchange of information among 
the authorities (Basel Committee, 2003b).  
 
Therefore, also with regard to regulatory issues, the strategic importance of 
learning is asserted, which must be pursued through the integration of explicit and 
tacit knowledge, promoting the creation of “communities of practice” (Gherardi, 
1999) and “communities of knowing” (Boland, Tenkasi, 1995), and enhancing the 
social dimension of knowledge. These perspectives are at the basis of the notion 
of “learning organization”, which aims at encouraging organizational learning and 
the creation of knowledge as key intangible assets and core competencies of a 
company. 
 
In order to improve knowledge management within the system and, in particular, 
in the extended community that includes the supervisors, it is necessary to accept 
and, therefore, strengthen the role of information, communication and knowledge 
as management and control tools. This means, first of all, accumulating and 
making available - within the network of organizational relations - the knowledge 
on corporate experience, by means of an extensive use of information techology. 
Secondly, it is necessary to maximize consistency between the subject of the 
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knowledge base and the manner of diffusion. The quality of knowledge 
management, in this case, can be recognized primarily in connection with the 
expected likelihood of the effective and efficient re-utilization of a certain 
“packaged” knowledge, i.e. in the fact that - once the knowledge transfer process 
has been activated - it may prove successful, translating into effective and 
efficient management behaviour. Thirdly, it is necessary to enhance access to and 
the transfer of knowledge. Knowledge can be transferred only if the following 
conditions are ensured: there must be trust between the parties; the parties 
concerned must be able to meet; they must, preferably, share the same language, 
or have a mutually accessible language; all the parties concerned must be 
motivated to exchange the information. All these pre-requisites may be more 
easily achieved if the system eatures a stable and strong culture (i.e. with a strong 
sense of identity), characterized by rules and systems of mutual relation, capable 
of consolidating the sense of belonging and sound principles of reciprocity.  
 
 
5. The culture of banks and supervisory authorities: a measurement 
analysis model, within the framework of a “culture compliance” 
 
In the attempt to measure certain profiles of the current level of consistency of the 
knowledge base and cultural models, between supervisors and supervised entities, 
this paper focuses on the cultural gap between the parties, which is investigated by 
means of a text-analysis approach.  
 
Corporate culture is perceived as the set of values and decisions that represent the 
manner in which individuals can perform their activities within the organization, 
and defines which behaviours may be considered appropriate (Schein, 1985). 
 
The study of corporate culture through language is a relatively new approach in 
economic literature. It is based on cultural anthropology, that is the methodologies 
for studying cultures based on the interpretation of their symbols and artifacts. 
The meaning ascribed to these aspects is subject to change, both in time, 
following evolutionary processes, and in respect of the cultural context taken into 
consideration. In this perspective, language may be considered a peculiar symbol 
and artifact of culture and, in consideration of the linguistic-textual differences 
when examining diverse cultural contexts, is a useful tool for understanding them. 
In the terms concerned by the paper, the issue has been only partially tackled in 
literature, and never with regard to financial institutions.  
 
Geertz (1973) speaks of culture in “semiotic” terms, when he maintains that his 
study “is not an experimental science in search of laws, but an interpretational 
science in search of meanings”. In a nutshell, he asserts the possibility of 
analysing social phenomena and organizational processes and behaviours by 
considering them as the symbols and artifacts typical of a cultural system. Schein 
(1985) identifies language as an artifact of the corporate culture and claims that it 
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is possible to analyse the different cultures through the vocabularies they are 
capable of expressing. Wuthnow (1989) claims that the linguistic categories and 
lexical expressions typical of a certain context allow the analysis of different 
corporate cultures, because their definition is closely related to the vocabulary 
developed within them. Lastly, DiMaggio (1997 and 2002) considers language the 
result of both social interaction and individual cognition. He maintains that, 
through the empirical analysis of written texts it is possible to determine the 
cultural aspects of language. This means that when the members of an 
organization use a term drawn from the vocabulary of their organization, what 
they’re really doing is making reference to an individual cognitive representation 
transformed into organizational behaviours shared by and common to the 
organization to which they belong (Rosa and Porac 2002). As regards the role of 
vocabularies (Berger, Luckmann 1967), of linguistic categories, it is further 
specified that - although in certain contexts it is (theoretically) possible to develop 
cultural categories even without a language - vocabularies play a very important 
role in their development and sharing (Levinson, 2003). 
 
All this implies that the analysis of culture is closely connected to the analysis of 
the type of vocabulary used by the members of an organization, which vocabulary 
is used in all the forms of communication, both oral and written, produced 
internally by that organization. The distinctive characteristics of every 
organization, therefore, are reflected in the documents it produces, and the 
language used may represent a key for their interpretation. In other words, if the 
organization leaves traces of its peculiar characteristics in the documents it 
produces, then it is possible to use text analysis to observe and “measure” these 
traces and determine their cultural implications.  
 
Based on this assumption, various surveys have been carried out in literature 
aimed at comprehending a series of issues concerning corporate culture, among 
which the research on the leadership characteristics within organizations 
(D’Aveni, MacMillan, 1990), the determinants of corporate reputation (Fombrun, 
Shanley, 1990), the measurement of the intensity of orientation to “corporate 
social responsibility” (Wolfe, 1991), the classification of the types of organization 
based on the existence and intensity of certain cultural values (Kabanoff, Holt, 
1996). These studies have two objectives in common: 
• to provide representations of the content of the corpus of texts; 
• to extract information, i.e. several properties, from the corpus of texts 
through quantity-based measurements. 
 
Compared to the previous studies, this paper focuses on an evolutionary aspect of 
text analysis, concerning standardization in the treatment of data, combined with 
the use of standard vocabularies. This allows a greater comparability of the output 
of the various studies, enabling us to further refine the analysis methodology. 
 
The analysis model includes the definition of several key concepts, at the base of 
the development of banking culture and that represent basic goals of the 
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prudential regulation (Carretta 2001). These must represent key management 
aspects, with respect to the banks concerned, and the attention by the supervisors 
(table 1). This ensures that the same concepts are treated with high intensity and 
frequence in the examined documents. 
  
Table 1 about here 
 
The model also includes categories that reflect Osgood’s semantic differential 
findings regarding language (Osgood, Suci, Tannenbaum, 1957) and other 
categories drawn from the Harvard IV Psychosocial Dictionary (Zuell, Weber, 
Mohler, 1989) and the Lasswell Value Dictionary (Lasswell, Namenwirth, 1969), 
both used as a gauge for the abovementioned key concepts. The different intensity 
of these categories, expressed in terms of “orientations”, characterizes each 
concept and allows us to compare the corporate culture against the various 
benchmark contests. Here we present the results of four orientations (Carretta 
2001; Carretta, Farina, Schwizer, 2005), among those surveyed, which are 
particularly significant for the parties in question (table 2): 
• Semantic orientation, relating the meaning of the key concepts. According 
to Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) most of the judgments referring 
the meaning of a particular concept could be classified as one of three 
types: i) an overall evaluation (positive – negative); ii) an assessment of 
potency (strong – weak); iii) a commentary on the degree of activity 
(active – passive). However, these factors or dimensions structuring the 
meaning are considered not exaustive: ”the representational state indexed 
by the semantic differential is not the only determinant operating in lexical 
encoding. It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition”. 
• Cognitive orientation, relating decision making process that depends to a 
significant degree on cognitive style of people. Generally, in fact, when 
formulating a decision referring to a certain problem it is necessary to 
analyze, to evaluate and to individuate the ways to solve it. In this sense 
some cognitive attitudes, such as understanding or information treatment, 
evaluation and problem solving abilities, and different levels of these 
could characterize the process in the case of different phenomena taken in 
consideration.  
• Disciplinary orientation, relating to the ways with which a certain 
phenomenon is described and comprises a (more theoretical) academic 
profile, and a business profile, which implies a more management-based 
approach. 
• Power orientation, relating the ways with which an organization is 
oriented, in terms of the propensity to share and cooperate, or in terms of 
authority and of the importance of the hierarchy. 
 
Table 2 about here 
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6. Survey methodology and main results  
 
The empirical assessment has been carried out as follows: 
• definition of the sample of banks to be analysed; 
• selection of the corpus to be analysed, for the institutions under 
investigation (i.e., Basel Committee, Bank of Italy and Italian banks); 
• analysis of the “concordances”, in respect of the key concepts for the 
culture of above mentioned institutions (this analysis allows the 
extrapolation of all the words contained in a text, listing them in 
alphabetical order accompanied by a context that makes it possible to 
grasp their meaning, and by a series of indications allowing the retrieval 
and location of a passage within the structure of a text); 
• analysis of the context “occurrences”, in respect of the key concepts of the 
culture of Basel Committee, Bank of Italy and Italian banks (this analysis 
allows the obtaining of lists of words making up a text, accompanied by 
the number of times in which they occur, besides the percentage compared 
to the total number of words); 
• comparison of the context occurrences and the language categories 
extracted from the Harvard IV Psycho – Social Dictionary and the 
Lasswell Value Dictionary; 
• determination of the predominant cultural orientation and of the relevant 
intensity. 
 
The survey was carried out on a uniform and representative sample (86,3%, based 
on total assets) of the top fifteen banking groups in Italy. 
 
Consistently with the other text analysis applications, the selection of the corpuses 
concerned public documents (Bowman, 1984; D’Aveni, MacMillan, 1990; 
Kabanoff, Waldersee, Cohen, 1995), such as financial reports, presentations and 
speeches by the top management of each institution. The study of the cultural 
differences was conducted for two years (1999 and 2004), according to a dynamic 
view of culture (Herskovits, 1955). For the text analysis proper, we used the 
Wordsmith 4 software developed by Oxford University (Scott, 1999). 
 
The analysis of concordance was carried out for each of the key concepts, so that 
the cultural analysis can be referred only to the terms that are actually associated 
with the key concepts. 
 
The last stage of the analysis concerned the comparison of the context occurrences 
of the key concepts and the vocabulary terms. The following formula was used to 
measure the intensity of the cultural orientation (Carretta, Farina, Schwizer, 
2005):  
 
Cultural Intensity Index = (Cx – Cy)/(Cx + Cy) 
 
We assume that: 
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• If the Cultural Intensity Index > 0:  the cultural orientation tends to the 
category X; 
• If the Cultural Intensity Index < 0: the cultural orientation tends to the 
category Y; 
• If the Cultural Intensity Index = 0 and Cx or Cy are different from 0: the 
cultural orientation is neutral. 
 
The formula allows us to obtain an index value standardized for all categories and 
comprised between +1 and –1. In fact, an index values of +1 or –1 means that the 
text is entirely culturally oriented, as regards the analysed category.  
 
Regarding the survey results, the methodology highlights proof of differentiation 
between the culture of Basel Committee, the culture of Bank of Italy and that of 
Italian banks, but it also emphasizes some significant examples of reduction of the 
cultural gap over the survey period. The values of the surveyed items are given in 
table 3. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Regarding semantic orientation, the gap concerning the meaning of the key 
concepts is not relevant for the parties (Italian banks, Bank of Italy and Basel 
Committee). However, in the surveyed period, it is possible to observe a gradual 
reduction of the gap between Italian banks and, rispectively, Bank of Italy and 
Basel Committee.  
 
In the first case (Italian banks and Bank of Italy), gap reduction is particularly 
significative for the concepts of “change” and “disclosure” (figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
In the second case (Italian banks and  Basel Committee), gap reduction is relevant 
for all key concepts considered in analysis and it is particularly significative for 
the concept of “customer” (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Regarding the cognitive orientation (figure 3), the significance of the various 
components (understanding, evaluation and problem solving) that guide the 
decision-making processes is constant over the survey period. The samples differ, 
albeit slightly, in the evaluation component, which appears larger for banks, and 
the component relating to understanding of the phenomena, which decisively 
characterizes the orientation of supervisors.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
 16 
Regarding disciplinary orientation (figure 4), the business approach prevails in 
Basel Committee and in banks, while in the case of Bank of Italy the textual 
analysis indicates a greater theoretical severity in representing the phenomena, 
typical of an academic approach.  
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
Regarding power orientation (figure 5), the cooperative approach prevails in Bank 
of Italy and in Italian banks, while in the case of Basel Committee the the textual 
analysis indicates an  authoritative approach.   
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
Moving on to examine each one of the key concepts for the banking business by 
the three samples, a distinction can be made between the situations explainable in 
terms of role-related necessity, and situations in which the reasons for the gap are 
less straightforward. 
 
The first category includes the concepts of change, customer and innovation. In 
this case, differences among Basel Committee, Bank of Italy and Italian banks 
may be explained by the different role played. On the one hand, Basel Committee 
and Bank of Italy have played a decisive role promoting innovation into the 
system and encouraging the adoption of new types of businesses, new 
management models and new systems of objectives. On the other hand, financial 
intermediaries can be considered the effective player of these change and 
innovatory processes. 
 
Cultural gaps are less easy to explain concerning the concepts of risk and 
disclosure. In this case, significant differences highlights a problem of non-shared 
judgements and determines the need to reduce the surveyed gap. Effectively, with 
regard to risk, gap features a constant and gradual downward trend but differences 
are still substantial, although there is a growing attention, in connection with the 
major financial scandals, with regard to disclosure.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Bank regulation models and supervisory approaches have changed significantly. 
The new relationship models between the supervisory authorities and the banks 
must be supported by organizational tools capable of fostering the sharing of 
information and promoting the advisory function of the supervisors. The new role 
of the supervisory bodies requires significant consistency between the knowledge 
bases and cultural models with the supervised entities.  
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The paper represents a first attempt made to measure the cultural gap between the 
three groups of stakeholders, through a text analysis model. This approach does 
not exhaust the perspective of cultural analysis, but it does open up a broad field 
of survey and suggests further investigation, also by means of ethnographical 
tools.  In the terms of the paper, the issue has been only partially explored in 
literature and never with respect to financial institutions.  
 
The contribution of this paper concerns three aspects, two relating to content and 
one to method. Firstly, what we observe is an overall convergence of meanings (in 
terms of semantic orientation) concerning all key concepts in the surveyed period.  
 
However the results expressed by other categories  highlight several significant 
cultural gaps, relating to important issues for the development of the system and 
the activities of banks, such as risk, disclosure, change and innovation. The 
different focus on these concepts in the examined texts points out the opportunity 
of identifying new opportunities of comparison between the parties and promoting 
the exchange of information and knowledge, as the basis for the improved sharing 
of objectives and guidelines.  
 
Secondly, there has been a gradual convergence of certain orientations and this 
means a virtuous trend towards a common cultural development. This trend can 
be fostered by banks through the full implementation of the internal control 
systems. 
 
Thirdly, from a methodological point of view, the significance of the cultural 
analysis in the reference industry can be highlighted. Therefore, it is expedient to 
develop this line of study, which can be done by applying the model in question to 
increasingly “internal” corpuses of texts and firm-specific documents, such as 
circular letters and internal service orders, organizational regulations and other 
materials reflecting the day-to-day performance of the corporate activities, for the 
purpose of bringing closer the survey method to the characteristics typical of 
ethnographical studies of culture. 
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Table 1 - Key concepts for the culture of both intermediaries and supervisory 
bodies 
 
Change 
Customer 
Disclosure 
Innovation 
Risk 
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Table 2 - The main categories for measuring cultural orientations  
 
Semantic orientation 
 
Positive - Negative 
Strong - Weak 
Active - Passive 
 
Cognitive orientation 
 
Understanding 
Evaluation 
Problem solving 
 
Disciplinary orientation 
 
Academic 
Business 
 
Power orientation 
 
Authority 
Cooperation 
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Table 3 - Final results on Disclosure, Customer, Innovation, Change, Risk 
measured on Banks, on Basel II and on Bank of Italy  
Key Concept Year Istitution 
Semantic 
orientation 
- Positive 
(X) vs. 
8egative 
(Y) 
Semantic 
orientation 
- Strong 
(X) vs. 
Weak (Y) 
Semantic 
orientation 
- Active (X)  
vs. Passive 
(Y) 
Cognitive 
orientation 
- Underst 
Cognitive 
orientation 
- Eval 
Cognitive 
orientation 
- Solve 
Disciplinary 
orientation - 
Academic 
(X) vs. 
Business (Y) 
Power 
orientation - 
Authority (X) 
vs.Cooperation 
(Y) 
CHANGE 1999 BANKS 1,00 1,00 0,31 0,40 0,20 0,40 -1,00 -1,00 
CUSTOMER 1999 BANKS 0,48 0,62 0,52 0,44 0,25 0,31 -0,25 -0,50 
DISCLOSURE 1999 BANKS 1,00 0,67 0,60 0,00 0,50 0,50 -0,50 0,00 
INNOVATION 1999 BANKS 0,74 0,93 0,61 0,00 0,00 1,00 -1,00 -1,00 
RISK 1999 BANKS 0,71 0,81 0,70 0,39 0,25 0,36 -0,04 0,00 
Average score 1999 BANKS 0,79 0,81 0,55 0,25 0,24 0,51 -0,56 -0,50 
CHANGE 2004 BANKS 0,60 0,87 0,41 0,29 0,43 0,29 -0,11 -1,00 
CUSTOMER 2004 BANKS 0,66 0,58 0,35 0,43 0,25 0,32 -0,24 -0,45 
DISCLOSURE 2004 BANKS 0,86 0,86 0,67 0,00 1,00 0,00 -0,14 -1,00 
INNOVATION 2004 BANKS 0,68 0,86 0,65 0,50 0,50 0,00 -0,09 -1,00 
RISK 2004 BANKS 0,65 0,74 0,55 0,36 0,28 0,36 -0,26 0,00 
Average score 2004 BANKS 0,69 0,78 0,52 0,32 0,49 0,19 -0,17 -0,69 
CHANGE 1999 
Basel 
comm. 
0,67 0,63 0,40 0,50 0,50 0,00 1,00 0,00 
CUSTOMER 1999 
Basel 
comm. 
1,00 0,78 0,00 0,67 0,00 0,33 0,00 0,00 
DISCLOSURE 1999 
Basel 
comm. 
0,81 0,79 0,40 0,60 0,20 0,20 -1,00 0,00 
INNOVATION 1999 
Basel 
comm. 
0,33 0,67 0,69 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 1,00 
RISK 1999 
Basel 
comm. 
0,90 0,96 0,42 0,38 0,33 0,29 0,00 0,33 
Average score 1999 
Basel 
comm. 
0,74 0,76 0,38 0,43 0,21 0,36 0,00 0,27 
CHANGE 2004 
Basel 
comm. 
0,54 0,60 0,59 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
CUSTOMER 2004 
Basel 
comm. 
0,43 0,87 0,67 0,29 0,29 0,43 -0,71 1,00 
DISCLOSURE 2004 
Basel 
comm. 
0,63 0,85 0,71 0,50 0,25 0,25 -1,00 1,00 
INNOVATION 2004 
Basel 
comm. 
1,00 1,00 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
RISK 2004 
Basel 
comm. 
0,65 0,55 0,41 0,32 0,32 0,36 0,11 0,20 
Average score 2004 
Basel 
comm. 
0,65 0,77 0,57 0,42 0,17 0,21 -0,32 0,44 
CHANGE 1999 
Bank of 
Italy 
0,54 0,89 0,77 0,60 0,20 0,20 -0,20 -1,00 
CUSTOMER 1999 
Bank of 
Italy 
0,66 0,84 0,53 0,43 0,14 0,43 -0,25 0,00 
DISCLOSURE 1999 
Bank of 
Italy 
0,43 0,94 0,63 0,20 0,40 0,40 1,00 1,00 
INNOVATION 1999 
Bank of 
Italy 
0,89 1,00 0,68 0,67 0,00 0,33 1,00 1,00 
RISK 1999 
Bank of 
Italy 
0,61 0,84 0,57 0,47 0,20 0,33 0,09 -0,50 
Average score 1999 
Bank of 
Italy 
0,63 0,90 0,63 0,47 0,19 0,34 0,33 0,10 
CHANGE 2004 
Bank of 
Italy 
0,71 1,00 0,69 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
CUSTOMER 2004 
Bank of 
Italy 
0,33 0,75 0,58 0,43 0,00 0,57 0,00 -0,33 
DISCLOSURE 2004 
Bank of 
Italy 
0,60 0,87 0,76 0,43 0,14 0,43 0,50 0,50 
INNOVATION 2004 
Bank of 
Italy 
0,68 0,85 0,74 0,57 0,14 0,29 0,33 0,00 
RISK 2004 
Bank of 
Italy 
0,51 0,81 0,46 0,44 0,20 0,36 0,00 -0,60 
Average score 2004 
Bank of 
Italy 
0,57 0,86 0,65 0,57 0,10 0,33 0,17 -0,09 
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Figure 1 - Semantic orientation gap: Italian banks – Bank of Italy 
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Figure 2 - Semantic orientation gap: Italian banks – Basel Committee 
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Figure 3 - Cognitive orientation 
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Figure 4 - Disciplinary orientation 
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Figure 5 - Power orientation  
 
Power orientation
-1,00
-0,80
-0,60
-0,40
-0,20
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
B
A
N
K
S
B
A
S
E
L
C
O
M
M
IT
T
E
E
B
A
N
K
 O
F
IT
A
L
Y
B
A
N
K
S
B
A
S
E
L
C
O
M
M
IT
T
E
E
B
A
N
K
 O
F
IT
A
L
Y
1999 2004
Authority
Cooperation
